Cahier I · The Go-To-Market

Price is the first message

Friday, 5 p.m. The deal has been hanging in the balance for six weeks. The sales rep calls in: "they'll sign at minus fifteen." The sales director rules in four minutes and approves. Fifteen points of margin against a contract — it's steep, but the quarter is riding on it, and the decision is defensible. (The scene is a composite: it belongs to no company in particular, and every executive committee will recognise it.)

It was handled as a concession. It was a declaration.

What price does

In January 2008, four researchers published in PNAS the result of an experiment: subjects tasted wines under functional magnetic resonance imaging, believing they were sampling different wines sold at different prices. Five wines were announced, only three were real: two were served twice, once as expensive, once as cheap. Twenty subjects were retained for analysis, an hour in the scanner each.

Raising the displayed price raises the pleasure reported. And it raises the activity measured in the medial orbitofrontal cortex — a region widely held to encode experienced pleasure.

The objection about sample size is the right one — twenty subjects is few, and that was common in brain imaging in 2008. It received its answer: in 2017, the same team replicated the effect in Scientific Reports, on an independent protocol and a larger sample — fifty-four participants, three wines announced at 3 €, 6 € and 18 €. Same result.

This is not "price influences the perception of quality." It is harder, and more precise: price does not alter the judgement passed on the experience after the fact. It alters the experience itself.

The lead author, Hilke Plassmann, is today a professor of marketing at INSEAD, where she holds the Octapharma Chair in Decision Neuroscience, and a principal researcher at the Paris Brain Institute of Sorbonne University. Her laboratory is in Fontainebleau. This is no Californian curiosity: it is taught an hour from your office.

The limit — and why it concerns you

It has to be stated at once, because it is real and a discerning reader will find it unaided.

Goldstein and his co-authors had 506 people taste wines blind — more than 6,000 tastings in all. Among non-experts, the relationship between price and pleasure is slightly negative: expensive wines are judged a little less enjoyable. The result has been replicated. And the same wines, tasted again with no price indication, no longer produce any difference.

A high price does not, therefore, make the product better. It makes the experience better for as long as the price stays present in the mind of the person experiencing it. Remove the information, and the effect disappears.

In a tasting, you forget the price. In a contract, never. It is on the purchase order, it is in your client's budget, it is dredged up at every review and every renewal. Your buyer does not go a single day without knowing what they paid.

The condition that bounds the effect in oenology is met continuously in your market. It is the one point in the argument where B2B is more favourable ground than the laboratory, and it must be said: nothing here rests on a generous extrapolation. The transfer from a glass of wine to a production line is not a given — the experience is called pleasure in one case, perceived risk and quality of service in the other. But if the mechanism holds, and nothing suggests why it would cease to hold here, then it holds no less firmly for you. It holds longer.

Back to Friday, 5 p.m.

The fifteen-point discount did not cost fifteen points of margin. It cost fifteen points of margin and a downward revision of what the client will experience of the product they have just bought — every day, for the entire life of the contract.

The committee ruled on the first term. The second was entered on no file. It appears on no dashboard. Yet it works its effects on the satisfaction with the contract just won, on the reference price of the next one, and on what this client will say about you to their network.

Who really sets your price

An executive committee spends weeks on its pricing policy. Grid, positioning, target margin, value narrative. The work is serious and it gets done.

Then a sales rep grants fifteen points on a Friday at 5 p.m., and does it again the following Friday.

The market does not read your grid. It reads the price of your transactions. The most widely read statement in your entire Go-To-Market — the one the prospect meets before your pitch, before your sales rep, before your website — is therefore not spoken by the executive committee. It is delegated, every week, to the person least equipped to gauge its reach, under the tightest constraint there is: the end of the quarter.

This is not the sales rep's fault. It is a fault of instrument. They were given a volume target and a discount latitude. They were never told they were doing the writing.

Two prices, two readings

Your price exists in two places, and the market does not read them the same way.

There is the price you display — grid, public positioning, the rate on your website, the level at which you present yourself. This is what the market sees of its own accord, without asking you anything. This is what the GTM NEXUS 360® approach observes: a displayed price that is legible, coherent and held feeds what the market understands of your positioning and of the value you claim.

And there is the price you practise — the actual transaction, the Friday discount, what the client really pays. That one, you alone know: it is in your system, not on your website.

The gap between the two is the diagnosis. When the practised price drifts durably away from the displayed price, you do not have a margin problem — you have two simultaneous positionings: the one you show the market, and the one you concede case by case. The market ends up learning the second and forgetting the first.

Bear in mind that your average discount rate says nothing: it is arguable, it depends on the mix, on the competition, on the maturity of buyers. It is its dispersion — by segment, by sales rep, by quarter — that speaks. It can be observed, and it tells you where your value narrative does not hold. (Chapter 8 will distinguish what these internal figures teach you from what measurement, for its part, observes on the outside.)

The bound

It has to be closed off, or the reader will do it against you. Armor-Lux generates about 40 % of its business in workwear — that is, on competitive tenders, a market where price is public, compared, standardised. The 2026 Carrefour contract, five years, some 40,000 staff, extends a relationship opened in 2014. A contract of that size is not won by being the cheapest bidder.

If price emitted everything, it would go to the lowest bidder. It does not.

Price is the first message. It is not the last — and a committee that dealt with price alone would simply have swapped one blind spot for another.

Price says what you are worth. It does not say for whom.

Chapter sources

  1. Plassmann, H., O'Doherty, J., Shiv, B., Rangel, A., PNAS, 105(3), 22 janvier 2008, p. 1050-1054 — doi:10.1073/pnas.0706929105. (20 sujets retenus, 21 recrutés dont 1 exclu).
  2. Schmidt, L. et al., « How context alters value », Scientific Reports, 7(1), 8098, 2017 — doi:10.1038/s41598-017-08080-0. (réplication, 54 participants).
  3. Goldstein, R. et al., « Do More Expensive Wines Taste Better? », Journal of Wine Economics, 3(1), 2008, p. 1-9 — doi:10.1017/S1931436100000523. (506 participants, 523 vins, 6 000+ dégustations).
  4. Armor-Lux — part du vêtement professionnel, marché Carrefour : presse économique, consolidé au chapitre 3.

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